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GAZING INTO THE FUTURE: THE 100-YEAR LEGACY
OF JUSTICE WILLIAM J. BRENNAN
Stephen J. Wermiel*
How should Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., be
remembered in 2056, one hundred years after he joined the
United States Supreme Court, or in 2090, one hundred years
after he left it?
There is no set convention for how we evaluate the success
or failure, the greatness or mediocrity, of our Supreme Court
Justices. This is the case even in their lifetimes, let alone
decades later. Yet there are some constants in Brennan's
legendary judicial career that may guide the way to evaluating
his legacy.
The Brennan legacy' likely exists in multiple forms. First,
as a philosophical matter, Brennan did more than perhaps any
* Fellow in Law and Government, American University Washington College of Law.
1. The role Justice Brennan played during thirty-four years on the Supreme Court, his
influence, and his legacy are discussed more fully in Seth Stem and Stephen Wermiel,
Justice Brennan: Liberal Champion (Houghton Mifflin Harcourt 2010). A full discussion
of Brennan's views on religion and the First Amendment can, for example, can be found in
Liberal Champion at 162-77, his views on the death penalty and the Eighth Amendment at
409-30, and his views on gender equality and the Equal Protection Clause at 385-408. And
a full discussion of his views on human dignity can be found in Stephen J. Wermiel, Law
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other Justice to frame the paramount value of the Constitution
and of the rule of law in terms of protecting individual human
dignity. Second, in some specific areas of law Brennan
contributed or advanced concrete tests and ideals that already
seem to have become bedrock principles. Finally, there are areas
of contemporary law in which Brennan's contributions will
continue to frame the debate, even if their grasp is eroding.
This essay will examine the influence of Brennan on five
facets of American law: government liability and accountability;
freedom of speech; separation of church and state; the death
penalty; and equality. In each of these fields, as with his entire
body of Supreme Court jurisprudence, Brennan developed an
overarching driving force that may be his most lasting
contribution to legal thought in the United States-the idea that
the Constitution, the courts, and indeed, the government itself
should be dedicated to the principle of advancing individual
human dignity. More than any Justice in history, Brennan
advanced the idea that, as he said, "[f]rom its founding, the
Nation's basic commitment has been to foster the dignity and
well-being of all persons within its borders." 2
In the years before Justice Brennan joined the Court, there
were rare, sparse references to human dignity or individual
dignity as a constitutional value that grew more frequent in the
Warren Court era. But Brennan made human dignity a focal
point, first of speeches,3 and then of his Court opinions, albeit
more often in dissent than in majority opinions.4 For Brennan,
although the question of how the Constitution protected and
advanced human dignity remained somewhat amorphous, the
value of human dignity was a driving force behind providing
greater protection for the rights of criminal defendants; finding
the death penalty to be cruel and unusual punishment in
and Human Dignity: The Judicial Soul ofJustice Brennan, 7 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 223
(1998).
2. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264-65 (1970).
3. Brennan began to develop the concept of law and human dignity in his first James
Madison Lecture, delivered at New York University Law School in 1961. See William J.
Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States, 36 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 761, 771 (1961).
4. See e.g. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 264-65; U.S. v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 684 (1987)
(Brennan, J., dissenting); O'Lone v. Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 368 (1987) (same).
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violation of the Eighth Amendment; and advancing equality for
different populations in American society.s
Since Justice Brennan left the Court in 1990, a number of
Justices have discussed the concept of human dignity in their
opinions.6 Although none has embraced the concept as broadly
as Brennan did, Justice Kennedy has advanced the idea with
greatest frequency, perhaps most powerfully in his opinion
striking down the Texas anti-sodomy law.7
There is little doubt that Justice Brennan took great pride in
helping to make the concept of protecting human dignity a part
of the constitutional fabric. As he said in a 1987 speech, "[t]he
vision of human dignity embodied in our Constitution
throughout most of its interpretive history is, at least for me,
deeply moving. It is timeless. It has inspired citizens of this
country and others for two centuries."8
GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY AND LIABILITY
Justice Brennan had a lasting impact in changing the
paradigm of government interaction with its citizens. Through a
series of unrelated opinions and doctrines, he built a body of
case law that, viewed as a whole, sought to make government
more directly accountable to the people, altering the traditional
notion that citizens seek government accountability and
responsibility through the electoral process. Taken together,
several areas of law in which he wrote important opinions create
5. See e.g. William J. Brennan, Jr., J., S. Ct. of the U.S., Remarks, The Essential
Dignity of Man 4 (Newark, N.J., Morrow Citizens Association on Correction Nov. 21,
1961) (referring to the provisions of the Bill of Rights and noting that "[a]ll of these
safeguards stem from the firm conviction of a free society that these safeguards are
essential to preserve simple human dignity") (copy on file with author); Furman v. Ga.,
408 U.S. 238, 270-73 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring); Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S.
609, 625 (1984) (Brennan, J.).
6. See e.g. Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, _ U.S. , 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2089 (2011) (Ginsburg,
Breyer & Sotomayor, JJ., concurring in the judgment); Brown v. Plata, _ U.S. _, 131
S. Ct. 1910, 1928 (2011) (Kennedy, J.); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 605 (2005)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting); Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 745 (2002) (Stevens, J.); U.S. v.
Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 713 (1998) (Breyer & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting).
7. Lawrence v. Tex., 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003).
8. William J. Brennan, Jr., J., S. Ct. of the U.S., Lecture, The Worldwide Influence of
the United States Constitution as a Charter of Human Rights 10 (N.Y., N.Y., Colum. L.
Sch. Bicentennial Celebration Nov. 20, 1987) (copy on file with author).
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a new vision, one that has taken hold in various forms and with
different degrees of longevity and tenacity.
The facets of this vision are facilitating citizens' ability to
sue local governments for liability and damages; exposing the
federal government to constitutional tort actions; and broadening
the reach of habeas corpus.9 The unifying theme in each of these
areas of law is that government should answer in court for the
harms it causes, either by correcting the misconduct or, where
necessary, by compensating those who were harmed or whose
rights were violated. This line of cases helped to alter the
traditional presumption that if you don't like what government is
doing, your main recourse is to vote public officials out of
office.
Consider these developments and their impact one at a
time. In Monell v. Department of Social Services,'0 Justice
Brennan wrote that municipal governments could be sued for
damages if they violated the civil rights of individuals pursuant
to local custom or policy, overruling an established precedent
and giving lie to the age-old presumption that you can't sue city
hall. Indeed, Justice Brennan said in Monell that 28 U.S.C. §
1983, originally passed as Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of
1871, "was intended to provide a remedy, to be broadly
construed, against all forms of official violation of federally
protected rights.""
Some critics have suggested that the rule of Monell is
difficult to administer because it is hard to tell when action is
taken pursuant to a municipal custom or policy.12 Others have
faulted Brennan for an unworkable distinction that imposes
liability on municipalities for injuries resulting from custom and
policy, but holds municipalities immune from respondeat
superior claims when plaintiffs are wronged by the actions of
individual municipal employees or officials.' 3 Still more hurdles
9. One Brennan project that failed was curbing the sovereign immunity of the states
under the Eleventh Amendment.
10. 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (overruling Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961)).
11. Monell, 436 U.S. at 700-01.
12. See e.g. Board of Comnrs. of Bryan Co. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 417 (1997)
(Souter, Stevens & Breyer, JJ., dissenting) (pointing out that the Monell requirements "may
be satisfied in more than one way," and referring to three alternative theories of liability).
13. Id. at 430-31 (Breyer, Stevens & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting) (noting that Monell has
generated "a highly complex body of interpretive law").
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exist in the form of qualified immunity conferred upon
government officials under a variety of circumstances. These
limitations and criticisms notwithstanding, however, it now
seems well-established that municipal liability is an important
available remedy for civil rights violations by local officials.
In a second line of government-accountability cases,
Brennan literally created the notion of constitutional torts,
enabling individuals to sue the federal government for violations
of rights guaranteed by the Bill of RiPhts. The lead case was
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents,' in which the Court held
that an implied right of action to remedy wrongs caused by the
actions of federal officials existed directly under the Fourth
Amendment.
This cause of action was expanded to other amendments by
Brennan,15 and it has since been expanded in lower federal
courts as well. As in the case of Monell, the Bivens doctrine has
encountered hostility in more conservative courts and has faced
a wide array of procedural hurdles. In particular, questions arise
with some frequency about the relationship between the Bivens
cause of action and the Federal Tort Claims Act and the degree
to which Congress has specified that claims against the federal
government and its employees should be pursued in actions
brought under the statutory remedy. 16 Still, Bivens actions are a
force to be reckoned with in the arena of federal government
accountability, and seem likely to remain so.
Finally, few undertakings meant more to Brennan than
trying to make habeas corpus a meaningful, effective remedy by
which, for the most part, convicted criminals could assert that
their rights were violated in one or more stages of law-
enforcement investigation or in prosecution and trial. In Fay v.
Noia,17 Brennan wrote that federal courts should be able to
review state criminal convictions unless defendants engaged in
"deliberate bypass" by failing to first raise their claims in state
court. This standard created a vigorous habeas process for some
years, giving defendants a means of complaining about-and
14. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
15. See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979).
16. See e.g. Hui v. Castaneda, 559 U.S. 799 (2010).
17. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
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attempting to remedy-errors and unconstitutional procedures in
state proceedings.
The Court has since overruled or limited parts of Fay, and
Congress has also restricted the scope of federal courts' habeas
review of state-court proceedings.' 8 But to the extent that habeas
remains and will remain an important, if limited, means of
holding government accountable, Brennan deserves much of the
credit.
THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Brennan's influence on freedom of speech was profound
and seems likely to last well into the future. His legacy for
religious freedom may be an example of an area of law in which
his view, although perhaps no longer carrying the day, may long
frame the debate about separation of church and state.
It is possible to argue that no one has done more than
Brennan to cement the view that the First Amendment requires a
democratic society to accept a high degree of sometimes
unwanted-even offensive-speech in order to support
genuinely free expression. Perhaps more than any other Justice,
Brennan moved the Court's paradigm beyond the famous
standard positing that free speech does not include the right of
"falsely shouting fire in a theater and causing a panic."1 9
Brennan saw clearly that this test did not protect enough speech
to foster a system of genuinely free expression.
Brennan led the Court in a direction that now seems
established and likely to last well into the future: protecting a
broad range of speech even when it is offensive, because that is
the only way to promote genuine debate and open expression in
a free society. The First Amendment, he wrote for the Court in
1964, reflects "a profound national commitment to the principle
that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and
18. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 747-48 (1991) (noting that "deliberate
bypass" standard was superseded by requirement that plaintiff show cause and prejudice);
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat.
1214 (1996) (amending federal statutory scheme to make obtaining federal habeas relief
more difficult).
19. Schenck v. U.S., 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (Holmes, C.J.) (also articulating famous
"clear and present danger" test).
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wide-open."20 A remarkable twenty-five years later he would
reiterate that view, writing for the Court in Texas v. Johnson2 1
that laws prohibiting the burning of the American flag as a form
of protest violated the First Amendment. "If there is a bedrock
principle underlying the First Amendment," he said there, "it is
that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea
simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or
disagreeable."22
How can we be sure of the longevity of this approach-
promoting genuine free expression by accepting a range of
speech so broad that it includes even highly offensive speech?
Well, there's this: A far more conservative Court, led by Chief
Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., applied Brennan's standard to find
First Amendment protection even for the deeply offensive and
highly controversial protests by a religious group at the funerals
of dead soldiers.23 Articulating a vision of free speech that
Brennan himself could well have written a generation earlier,
Roberts wrote that
[s]peech is powerful. It can stir people to action, move
them to tears of both joy and sorrow, and-as it did here-
inflict great pain. On the facts before us, we cannot react to
that pain by punishing the speaker. As a Nation we have
chosen a different course-to protect even hurtful speech
on public issues to ensure that we do not stifle public
debate.24
While it is of course difficult to know how the values of our
society will evolve or change in coming decades, conservatives'
solid embrace of this free-speech vision, and their continuing to
build on its foundation of liberal support, makes this doctrine a
very strong candidate for transcendent value as part of
Brennan's legacy.
Brennan was less successful in his effort to cement the
view that the Establishment Clause requires a high, sturdy wall
of separation between church and state. While it was Thomas
20. N.Y Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
21. 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (Brennan, J.).
22. Id. at 414.
23. Snyder v. Phelps, _ U.S. _, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011).
24. Id. at 1220.
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Jefferson who first used the image of a "wall of separation," 2 5
Brennan believed adamantly that the best way to protect
freedom of religion in the United States was to keep religion and
government separate and then to protect the ability of
individuals to practice their faith. To Brennan, this view entailed
keeping government almost entirely out of the sphere of
religion.
Although he was no originalist, Brennan believed deeply
that his approach was rooted in history, in the language of the
First Amendment, and in the intent of James Madison and others
who contributed to the content of the Bill of Rights. He spelled
this out in his most heartfelt discussion of the issue:
The principles which we reaffirm and apply today can
hardly be thought novel or radical. They are, in truth, as old
as the Republic itself, and have always been as integral a
part of the First Amendment as the very words of that
charter of religious liberty.2 6
As the Court has grown more conservative, this view,
which Brennan espoused with much success during his tenure,
has been eroded by Justices who believe that the First
Amendment does not require such strict separation. But to a
large degree the Brennan vision of a strict separation between
church and state is still the focal point for debate and decision as
issues of religious freedom continue to arise.
THE DEATH PENALTY
Justice Brennan was during his tenure, and remains today,
the most ardent opponent of the death penalty ever to have
served on the Supreme Court. His view was that the death
penalty was inherently a violation of the Eighth Amendment
because it was in every respect "cruel and unusual
25. Braunfield v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 604 (1961).
26. Sch. Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 304 (1963) (Brennan,
J., concurring).
27. At least one Brennan decision has been overruled. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S.
203 (1997) (overruling Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985)).
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punishment." 28 His belief in the unconstitutionality of the death
penalty became a central identifying feature of his Supreme
Court tenure.
While Brennan spoke on this subject most often in dissent,
sometimes joined only by Court ally Justice Thurgood Marshall,
it is fair to suggest that he played an important role in educating
the American people-citizens, lawmakers, and other judges
and Justices-about the inequities in the implementation and
enforcement of capital punishment. His doubts about the death
penalty surely contributed to the moratorium movement that has
been gaining ground in the states for some years and seems
likely to continue expanding. His oft-expressed concerns seem
clearly to have influenced other Justices, at the very least by
keeping the issue in the forefront: Justice Harry Blackmun, for
example, did not credit Brennan but renounced the use of the
death penalty before leaving the Court in 1994.
Brennan certainly did not persuade the Court or the country
to abandon capital punishment. But he was a steady source of
fuel to keep the fire burning against the death penalty, and that
flame seems likely to continue flickering for a long time to
come.
EQUALITY
Brennan's legacy for equality in the United States is a tale
of some obvious achievement. Yet it also includes some less
clear outcomes.
He took the lead on the Supreme Court in bringing gender
discrimination within the scope of the anti-bias umbrella of the
Equal Protection Clause, explaining the need and his reasoning
most clearly in 1973 and then prevailing as a matter of
constitutional standards in 1976.29 This success was clear and
lasting. While today's Court does not demand quite as rigorous
an explanation for gender-based government actions as it does
28. Brennan first expressed this view in Furman v. Ga., 408 U.S. 238, 286 (1972)
(Brennan, J., concurring), and then held to it as long as he remained on the bench, never
again voting to uphold a capital sentence.
29. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677
(1973).
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for those that are based on race, the place of gender under the
equal protection umbrella seems certain to endure.
Less clear is the outlook for affirmative action intended to
make up for decades of segregation and other forms of race
discrimination. Brennan was a leader on the Court for more than
a decade in fighting to preserve the use of affirmative action to
promote diversity and to overcome the lingering effects of
discrimination. But the vigorous view he espoused is not
championed by today's Justices, and the use of affirmative
action appears now to be hanging by a thread.
CONCLUSION
The Brennan legacy likely to stand a century from now is a
substantial one: He shaped the current constitutional doctrines
that seem in some areas destined to remain dominant into the
future, and in other areas he framed the debate in ways that will
long continue to challenge those who disagree with his
interpretations. He left an important and enduring mark in the
constitutional sands, one that the tides of history seem unlikely
to erase.
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